This, however, is only a common-sense rule of language. To discipline this power of wide discretion, to avoid arbitrariness in judicial process and to provide precedents, the courts themselves have evolved in the course of judicial process principles, theories, rules and doctrines for the interpretation of statutes so as to provide guidelines in that process.
She claimed that she was paid less than the minimum wages payable under the Act. The police did not see Mr. The meaning of a word is also affected by its context.
I look in particular at what he Lee v knapp in paragraph 2 of the case: The context may consist of the Lee v knapp sections, the whole Act, or indeed the whole area of legislation.
Ita scriptum est as the words are is the first principle of interpretation. The Catering Wages Act, prescribed minimum wages payable to workers in catering establishments.
Owen that the report which I have before me does not disclose whether or not there is in the Australian statute a subsection 2 such as there is in section 77 of the English Act ofwhich provides that a driver may report an accident to the police within 24 hours, though he must do it so soon as reasonably practicable, if he has not given his name and other particulars at the scene of the accident.
Kay, the transport manager, it seems, but presumably having been told by Mr. When he got there the defendant had gone, but the transport manager came up very shortly afterwards and duly exchanged particulars with Mr.
It is not necessary to go into the details of the matter. The power given under Section 65 of the Highways Actto lop trees growing near a highway was construed in the popular sense as confined to cutting of lateral branches, and not exceeding to topping.
A judge should not, generally, go beyond the words of law and try to discover its spirit from extraneous sources. She was provided with full boarding but not with lodging.
The second category of workers are those who are not given either full boarding or lodging by the employer. It is another rule of language. In dealing with the matters relating to the general public, statutes are presumed to use words in their popular, rather than their narrow, legal or technical sense.
The plaintiff in this case was a worker in a catering establishment. The courts may also interpret statutory words in the light of the definitions provided in the interpretation clause of the statute itself.
However, Lord Esher pointed out that certain words may be attributed some special or technical meaning if the context justifies it.
The court held that it was a case of casus omissus and she was not entitled to minimum wages under the Act. The general rule is that the judge must take it for granted that the legislature has said what it meant and meant what it said.
Glanwille Williams prefers to call as literal and free interpretation. Another example of a rule of language in a legal maxim is the ejusdem generis rule which serves to restrict the meaning of general words to things or matters of the same kind as the preceding particular words.
To my mind it would be wholly unsatisfactory if this were not a personal duty laid upon the driver in his capacity as driver. Knapp 2 Q. Context may even give the word a meaning which is not to be found in the dictionary.
The first category of workers are those who are given full boarding and lodging by the employer. Thus the judges are not at liberty to add or to take from or modify the letter of the law simply because they believe that the spirit of the law is not adequately expressed by the litera legis or that the spirit could have been better expressed in a more appropriate language.eg Lee v Knapp 2 QB 44 Road Traffic Act UK required the driver to stop from BU at Nanyang Technological University.
Citation. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3dInd. LEXISWL (Ind. June 12, ) Brief Fact Summary. Knapp is the (D). He claims self. For example in Lee v. Knapp  3 All E.R.D.C. section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, (U.K.) which is drafted in terms very similar to our section 81(1) as follows.
In Lee v. Knapp (), Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, requires that the driver of a motor vehicle shall stop after an accident.
Winn L.J. said that he would not wish to give the impression that a momentary pause after an accident would exempt the driver of a car from the necessity of stopping to give particulars. In Lee v. Knapp,31 section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, provided that "a driver causing accident shall stop after the accident", the interpretation of the word “stop" was in question.
In this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then ran away/5(9). • e.g.
Lee v Knapp  2 QB 44, Road Traffic Act (UK) required the driver to “stop” after being involved in a traffic accident – and this means? This preview has intentionally blurred sections.Download